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The Arctic Ice Melt: Emerging
Resources, Emerging Issues
Student Note
By: Thomas Au, Theodore Parran III,Jessica Rubin, and
Jonathan Slomski

Introduction & Abstract
The permanent melting of Arctic sea ice has created a unique
application of a wide array of international statutes and regulations to
a complex, global issue. As the Arctic sea ice melts, more resources
are becoming available, and countries neighboring the Arctic-and
some beyond the shadow of the Arctic-are competing for a multitude
of formerly untapped resources. Canada has an especially critical role
in the post-Arctic sea ice arena due to both its location and its highlyprotective native rights. Although it is more frequently perceived
through the lens of an environmental crisis, the permanent melting of
Arctic sea ice and the race to control the Arctic's resources promises
to be one of the key international law struggles of the twenty-first
century.
Regular Arctic sea ice melt is not distinctive of the modem day.
Indeed, it is a naturally occurring process that occurs cyclically
throughout the seasons. However, Arctic sea ice melt has recently
become accelerated
due to the harmful effects of global
industrialization and its externalities. A devastating cycle has been
initiated in the Arctic that scientists predict will bring an end to
Arctic sea ice as we know it. The opening of the Arctic is ushering in
a potentially historic bounty of natural resources, and the amount of
oil and natural gas that will become available is staggering. The
Arctic sea ice melt will require international cooperation to prevent
the outright usurpation of the Arctic's riches.
Offshore drilling in Canada and the United States is managed by
their respective federal governments. However, Canada and the
United States employ significantly different approaches towards the
regulatory management of exploration, leasing, development, and
production of offshore oil and gas. It is critical to understand the
differences in these approaches in order to effectively manage the
emerging natural resources and resolve impeding disputes.
As the ice melts and resources become readily accessible, states
are looking to stake their claim and reap the financial benefits. While
both Russia and China have made overt strides at claiming resources,
Canada and the United States are following the appropriate dispute
resolution mechanisms outlined in the United Nations Charter ("UN
Charter") and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") to resolve contested disputes. The conflicting claims
over resources in the Beaufort Sea offers a unique insight into the

Canada-United States relationship and their multifaceted judicial and
diplomatic approach to the dispute.
The recent creation of Nunavut and its grant of semi-autonomy as
a distinct, aboriginally administered federal territory complicates the
regulatory environment in the Canadian Arctic.
Overlap and
ambiguity in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act create several
emerging legal conflicts between the regulatory powers of Nunavut
and the Canadian federal government.
However, Canada has
developed a workable solution based on historical initiatives with its
eastern provinces regarding offshore resource management.
The permanent melting of Arctic sea ice is clear and present.
With much of the Arctic's natural riches becoming increasingly
exposed, it is imperative that the international community react
responsibly to reach an equitable resolution between competing
claims. Canada has an especially vital role in the entire process, and
the manner in which international and native rights are balanced will
have an indelible effect on the future of the Arctic.
I.

The Science Behind the Melt

There is perhaps no environmental
issue so immediate and
omnipresent as the permanent melting of Arctic sea ice. Under normal
global conditions, Arctic sea ice grows and shrinks seasonally from
variations in temperature and sunlight. There are some natural
phenomena, including polar amplification, that have hastened ice melt
throughout Earth's history, but when observed and considered in the
long run, those processes have had a negligible effect when considering
the current, dismal state of Arctic sea ice. Since the advent of humaninitiated environmental degradation, Arctic sea ice has been depleted
at an alarming rate. The twenty-first century has seen a stream of
new record lows of sea ice extent. Pollution and other human
activities have caused the unprecedented Arctic sea ice melt, and
naturally occurring, scientific processes exhibiting positive feedback
have exponentially accelerated the record melt. This section begins
with a brief primer on the Arctic as a geographic region, and then
describes the scientific processes involved in the Arctic sea ice melt,
from those that occur naturally to those man-made. Finally, the
significance of these processes is illustrated through a description of
the positive feedback loop at work in the melt.
A.

Arctic Ice, Measurements, andExpected Melting

The Arctic conjures up images of a barren, frigid scene, replete
with ice and snow. Indeed, the Arctic is primarily comprised of an

ocean bordered by a spattering of islands and larger masses,' and
covers about six percent of Earth's surface.2 In the most precise sense,
the Arctic encompasses all of Earth north of 66 degrees, 32 minutes
North Latitude (the Arctic Circle).' Other definitions used mainly by
scientists include the area beyond the northernmost point at which
upright trees can grow (the "tree line") and the northern latitude area
where the average daily temperature fails to rise above ten degrees
Celsius.4 Regardless of the definition, the Arctic's most significant
feature is Arctic sea ice: floating frozen seawater, much of which
perennially covers the central Arctic Ocean.5 Sea ice is unique in that
it originates entirely in water, as opposed to glaciers, icebergs, ice
sheets, and ice shelves, which are all initially formed on land.6
Actually measuring sea ice can be complicated and, at times,
problematic.
The two methods for measuring sea ice are "extent" and
"area." 7 When determining the volume of sea ice in the Arctic, the
more simple method is measuring extent.8 Measuring sea ice extent
involves categorizing an area of the ocean as "covered" or "not
covered." 9 Using satellite technology, scientists divide the Arctic and
surrounding areas into individual pixels on a map, and if a certain
pixel is at least fifteen percent covered in sea ice, then that cell's area
is considered "covered" for purposes of the calculation.'" This process
can lead to overestimating the amount of actual sea ice in the Arctic.
For example, a given area of ten pixels may have fifteen percent sea
ice coverage on each individual cell, but that area will be defined as
one hundred percent covered under the definition of extent.
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Conversely, measuring area consists of determining the precise
amount of ocean covered by sea ice." The same satellite data used for
extent is evaluated, but only the percentages of the pixels covered by
sea ice are considered.2 A pixel with fifteen percent sea ice coverage
will be counted simply as fifteen percent (more precisely, fifteen
percent multiplied by the pixel's land area) for an area calculation.
Thus, a measurement of the Arctic's sea ice extent will almost always
be greater than a measurement of its sea ice area. 3 Generally, the
scientific community relies on the extent method as more reliable than
the area method because determining whether a pixel has greater than
or less than fifteen percent coverage is much easier than determining
a precise percentage of coverage. 4 Despite their differences, both
measurements are essential. Both the concentration (area) and the
scope (extent) of sea ice must be analyzed in order to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the state of Arctic sea ice. For most
investigations into the changes occurring to Arctic sea ice, extent is
used because it explains, in a more comprehensive sense, the overall
scope of the Arctic affected.
Though the most central area of Arctic sea ice (the "cap")
remains frozen throughout the year, the volume of Arctic sea ice ebbs
and flows with seasonal changes. Indeed, some degree of melt is a
natural process, usually beginning in March and continuing through
September. 5 In the first half of the twentieth century, this natural
melt and freeze resulted in Arctic sea ice extent with an average
maximum of about 14,000,000 km2 and an average minimum of about
11,000,000 km 2.' 6 However, since the 1950s, there has been a sharp
decline in the extent of Arctic sea ice year-round. 7 The maximum in
2005 was about 1,000,000 km 2 lower than the maximum in 1950, and
the minimum was about 4,000,000 km 2 lower over that same time
period. 8 In 2012, the Arctic sea ice extent minimum decreased to
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3,410,000 km 2-the
lowest ever recorded in the history of satellite
data usage. 9 Even though a natural sea ice melt-freeze process is
expected in the Arctic, the rate at which the ice is melting and its
ever-shrinking minimum and maximum extents has made it
alarmingly clear to the scientific community that all is not well in the
Arctic."
B.

Processes at Work in the Melt

A number of natural processes work in unison to cause the growth
and reduction of Arctic sea ice. Before analyzing the sources of the
major climatic changes that have led to an unprecedented decline in
Arctic sea ice, it is important to understand the processes that
underlie any and all changes in sea ice quantities.
1. Thermodynamics
Sea ice melts and grows as a result of processes known as
thermodynamics. 2 Due to the fact that the Arctic Ocean's water is
anywhere between thirty-two and thirty-seven practical salinity units
(psu),22 its water begins to freeze at -1.8 degrees Celsius.23 In reality,
however, the situation becomes more complicated when considering
heat exchange and varying salinity.2 4 As Arctic air chills sea water to
its freezing point, sea ice begins to form, and the surrounding sea
water must cool to support that growth. 5 Cooling occurs as heat from
the water beneath the sea ice escapes through the ice via conduction.26
As growth continues and sea ice thickens, it increasingly blocks that
heat from escaping. 7 When sea ice is so thick that heat can no longer
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be conducted out through it, it has reached the point of
thermodynamic equilibrium, which occurs when sea ice is around
three meters thick.2" Reaching thermodynamic equilibrium takes sea
ice numerous years of growth and melt cycles. 9 Any snow
accumulated atop the sea ice has a similar insulating effect and slows
30
the overall growth.
Despite the effects of ice and snow on slowing conduction, they
play a major role in reflecting a large amount of radiant heat and
keeping the Arctic cool.31 Due to differences in albedo, the surface
that receives direct sunlight makes an enormous difference in its
temperature and, consequently, the overall welfare of Arctic sea ice. 32
Snow covered ice has the highest albedo and reflects the highest
percentage of radiation of all other Arctic surfaces; about ninety
percent of all solar radiation that contacts snow covered ice is
reflected away from the surface.33 Ice with an albedo of around 0.5
reflects about half of the solar radiation it receives." However, the
amount of solar radiation that ice does absorb is sufficient enough to
initiate sea ice melt, but not to a serious degree.35 Water has the
lowest albedo of all the surfaces at 0.06 and thus absorbs
approximately ninety-four percent of all solar radiation that contacts
its surface.36 The reflectivity of snow and ice plays an essential role in
protecting Arctic sea ice from the full power of solar rays.
The application of albedo to Arctic ice melt is clear: the less sea
ice in the Arctic, the more solar radiation the Arctic will absorb.37
Following that reasoning, there is a clear danger for the Arctic when
considering this inherent positive feedback loop. Rising temperatures
lead to snow and ice melt, which in turn decreases high albedo
surfaces and increases low albedo surfaces, and an overall lower
albedo increases the Arctic's temperature which subsequently leads to
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melted high albedo surfaces.3" The two processes working in tandem
have the ability to cause a quickened and pervasive melt, but as long
as the environment is stable and functioning normally, albedo
feedback can be overcome by natural climatic cycles.
2. Dynamics
Arctic sea ice is constantly on the move. Dynamics do not affect
the concentration of sea ice in a given area as much as the location of
a particular piece of sea ice. The most impressive dynamic forces
affecting sea ice are wind and ocean currents.39
Wind is the most obvious and most impactful force behind sea ice
movement, accounting for up to seventy percent of all sea ice
movement over a given period.4 ° As wind blows over sea ice, it pushes
the ice at a rate of about two percent of the speed of the wind.'
Gradually, the sea ice wears down and the rate at which it travels
slows.42 Newly-formed sea ice is especially vulnerable to the wind's
physicality and is more likely to be pushed into warmer waters to
melt. 43 Wind also works in conjunction with solar radiation, since sea
ice blown free of snow has a higher albedo than snow-covered sea
ice. 44 Thus, wind has the ability to influence both the position of sea
ice and its albedo.
Ocean currents also play a large role in sea ice movement but in a
more long-term sense than wind.45 Most notably, the direction in
which ocean currents pull sea ice is generally the opposite of the wind
direction. 46 This push-pull stress causes a wearing-away of the outer
layers of sea ice and degrades the sea ice in an accelerated fashion.47
As sea ice is strained, its internal ice stress is decreased. 48 The thinner,
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less dense sea ice melts at a higher rate than thicker sea ice created
and maintained under pressure. 9 Unlike the short-term impact of
wind, the rate at which scientists study ocean current effects on sea
ice is measured in terms of months and years."
C.

Global Warming: the Underlying Perpetrator

Though the Earth has gone through elongated periods of heating
and cooling throughout its history, the present-day, imminent global
warming is widely-accepted in the scientific community as the product
of centuries of environmental
mistreatment, and the problem is
disproportionately affecting the Arctic." Pre-industrialized Earth was
able to equalize almost all pollutants that were created through
natural processes. 2 However, beginning in the late 1700s, humans
began producing greenhouse gases at a rate that could not be offset,
and greenhouse gases began to accumulate in Earth's atmosphere. 3
Lasting for centuries, these pollutants trap heat within the
atmosphere and offset Earth's delicate energy balance. 4 Perilously
situated at the northernmost area of the planet, the Arctic is
particularly susceptible to global climate change and is enduring the
devastating effects of global warming sooner and more viciously than
any other area. 5
The United States Select Committee on Energy Independence and
Global Warming ("SCEIGW") defines "global warming" as "the
global temperature rise and subsequent impacts from the increase of
heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere from human activities,
primarily the combustion of fossil fuels."56 The heat-trapping gases
that the SCEIGW refers to are greenhouse gases-most notably
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, ozone, and water vapor-that
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become lodged within the Earth's atmosphere and absorb energy,
blocking much of the infrared energy that would otherwise naturally
dissipate into space.57 As the world gradually burned more and more
fossil fuels to feed industrialization, carbon dioxide emissions have
increased exponentially. 8 Tracking the past four hundred thousand
years, scientists had never observed atmospheric carbon dioxide in
amounts over 300 parts per million (ppm), and measurements usually
averaged around 240 ppm. 9 However, since the 1950s, atmospheric
carbon dioxide has annually set increasingly new record highs and is
currently nearing 400 ppm.60 Frighteningly, carbon dioxide has an
atmospheric lifespan of up to one hundred years.6 1 Thus, even if
humans stopped creating carbon dioxide emissions today, the
atmosphere would not be rid of carbon dioxide-merely one
greenhouse gas in the equation-until potentially the twenty-second
century. This anthropogenic sequence will continue without full-scale,
human-led intervention to combat pollution emissions on the front
end.62
In addition to carbon dioxide, methane gas emission has played a
unique role in global warming. Though methane only has up to a
fifteen year lifespan in the atmosphere, it is over twenty times more
effective at trapping energy than carbon dioxide.63 Like carbon
dioxide, the amount of methane in the atmosphere has increased
exponentially since the Industrial Revolution. Pre-1700 levels hovered
around 700 parts per billion (ppb), but currently, atmospheric
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methane is present at levels around 1900 ppm and rising.64 Humans
have disseminated methane through the use of landfills, agricultural
operations, wastewater treatment, fossil fuel production, and certain
industrial operations. 65 Yet through the initiation of global warming,
the release of natural sources of methane has intensified, especially in
the Arctic.6 6 As Arctic sea ice melts, it releases ancient methane that
has been trapped in pockets within the sea ice.67 Even more alarming,
scientists have identified over one hundred and fifty thousand seeps of
methane throughout the Arctic, 6 mostly connected to three massive
reservoirs, which had been contained by sea ice, ice shelves, frozen sea
beds, and permafrost up until the past century. 69 This "ticking time

bomb" situation could have dire consequences.7" Should the Siberian
ice shelf s permafrost melt, it alone would emit an amount of methane
twelve times the current quantity in the atmosphere.7' Considering
the overabundance of methane present in the atmosphere, this event
would undoubtedly add catastrophic implications to the already dire
situation in the atmosphere. The result of the increase in greenhouse
gases is a more severe greenhouse effect and a progressively warmer
planet blanketed in pollutants without a way to cool itself.
D.

PositiveFeedback andIntensified Processes

The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to climate change because of
its location. This susceptibility has led some to refer to the Arctic as
the "canary in the coal mine" of global warming.72 Situated atop the
Northern Hemisphere, the Arctic is subjected to the effects of polar
amplification and the summation of a host of positive feedback
64.
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mechanisms that intensify climatic change in the northern pole at a
much faster rate than the rest of the planet.73 The aforementioned
deleterious processes work together to warm the Arctic, collectively
precipitating Arctic sea ice melt. Greenhouse gases slightly warm the
planet and sea ice begins to melt. As sea ice melts, the overall albedo
of the Arctic decreases, and solar radiation is increasingly absorbed,
warming the Arctic environment. As the Arctic warms, methane
embedded inside and underneath ice is released and collects in the
atmosphere, increasing the greenhouse effect and warming the entire
planet. Thus, the positive feedback cycle comes full circle. These
effects result in an overall warming of the Arctic that occurs 1.5 to 4.5
times faster than the rest of the planet.74

Though much of the Arctic sea ice melt can be connected back to
natural processes, the rate at which the sea ice is melting is
undisputedly unnatural. Dynamic forces work to physically displace
and weaken sea ice,75 and thermodynamic forces diminish sea ice
through increased temperatures.76 With the presence of global
warming, these natural processes have hastened and are themselves
contributing to global warming through the release of additional
pollutants.77 Global temperatures over the past century have increased
at a rate of eight times faster than ice-age recovery periods, and the
resulting impact on Arctic sea ice is evident.78 Just this past
September 2012, Arctic sea ice extent reached its lowest level ever
recorded in the satellite era.79 Some scientists fear that it is only a
matter of time until Arctic sea ice disappears completely in the
summer months.80 Regardless of the eventual extent of the melt, the
Arctic sea is certainly transitioning away from its frigid, ice-laden
past into a new era of increasingly open waters set for exploration and
development.
73.
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II.

Resources Made Available Due to the Melt

Ever-shrinking Arctic sea ice is continually opening an immense
area that is ripe with natural resources. Most notably, oil and gas will
be made available in historically large amounts." The Beaufort Sea,
which is just north of Alaska, the Yukon, and the Northwest
Territories, has been a focal point in the race for the Arctic's natural
resources.82 Countries and businesses have already begun to build
infrastructure in anticipation of a race for oil and gas riches.83 To a
lesser extent, minerals-including rare earth minerals-and drinking
water are becoming increasingly available as the sea ice melts.8 4 The
Arctic is fast becoming a veritable treasure trove for countries and
companies seeking to cash-in on one of the planet's most untouched
source of natural resources. This section describes the types of
resources that are becoming progressively more available due to the
sea ice melt, from oil to natural gas to various other resources,
including minerals, fish stocks, and drinking water.
A.

Oil

Below Arctic sea ice lays a massive amount of oil that is
increasingly accessible due to sea ice melt. Onshore oil reserves in the
Arctic Circle already account for two hundred and forty billion barrels
of oil, or about ten percent of the world's discovered oil reserves.85
Offshore reserves, however, remain mostly undiscovered in the Arctic,
a fact that would undoubtedly change with the permanent melting of
Arctic sea ice.86 The United States Geological Survey ("USGS")
predicts that there is approximately ninety billion barrels of available
oil in the area above the Arctic Circle.87 This amount would equal
81.

See, e.g., Arctic
STUD.
(Jul.
development.

82.

See

Oil and Gas Development, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L
12,
2011),
http://csis.org/event/arctic-oil-and-gas-

LIN CALLOW, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY
FORECAST (2012), available at www.beaufortrea.ca/wp-content/uploads/

2012/04/Beaufort-Sea-OG-activity-forecast-2012-2017.pdf.

83.

See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Race Is On as Ice Melt Reveals Arctic
Treasures, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/09/19/science/earth/arctic-resources-exposed-by-warming-set-offcompetition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

84.

Id.

85.

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
CIRCUM-ARCTIC
RESOURCE
APPRAISAL:
ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC
CIRCLE
1 (2008), available at pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-

86.

Id.

87.

90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas
Assessedin the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Jul. 23, 2008, 1:00

3049.pdf [hereinafter

ARCTIC CIRCLE ESTIMATES].

approximately thirteen percent of the world's undiscovered and
accessible oil and provide a boom for the countries and companies
that are able to claim it. 88 British Petroleum and Exxon are already
vying for pole position in the race for Arctic oil in Russian territory. 9
B.

Natural Gas

The area beneath Arctic sea ice is replete with stores of natural
gas.9" The USGS estimates that reserves of natural gas approach 1,670
trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas,9 and forty-four billion
barrels of recoverable natural gas liquids.92 Natural gas, unlike oil, is
spread out among the geological provinces and could thus be more
difficult to harvest than oil.93 Inherent difficulties in harvesting and
transporting natural gas could also add substantial expenses onto
natural gas operations in the Arctic.9 4 Nonetheless, it is estimated
that the Arctic holds approximately thirty percent of the world's
undiscovered natural gas reserves.95 So far, Russian companies,
including global energy giant Gazprom, appear to be leading the way
in exploration and extraction, but other countries and companies will
undoubtedly vie for potential gaseous riches hidden below the Arctic
surface.96
As Arctic sea ice diminishes, commercial opportunities to reap the
bounties of natural riches once hidden beneath the ice increase. An
industry-shifting amount of oil and natural gas deposits are predicted
to become available as the ice recedes. Additionally, minerals, fish,
and drinking water, though to a lesser extent, may soon be collected
PM),
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID= 1980#.UJ79plJNiZR
[hereinafter Arctic Natural Gas].
88.

Id.

89.

See Andrew E. Kramer, Exxon Reached Arctic Oil Deal With Russians, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/
business/global/exxon-and-rosneft-partner-in-russian-oildeal.html?pagewanted=all.

90.

See Rosenthal, supra note 83.

91.

Arctic Natural Gas, supra note 87.

92.

ARCTIC CIRCLE ESTIMATES,

93.

See id.

94.

SeeArctic Oil and Natural Gas Resources, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4650.

95.

Id.

96.

See Gazprom Embarks on Eastern Gas Pipeline, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Nov.
1, 2012, 7:45 AM),
http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/EnergyResources/2012/11/01/Gazprom-embarks-on-eastem-gas-pipeline/UPI63181351770356.

supra note 85, at 1.

in order to feed a growing demand. Even though the research has
been conducted and the data has been collected, the looming question
of who owns the resources made available is perhaps the most
essential inquiry when considering the commercial impact of the
Arctic melt.
III. Oil and Gas Law and Regulation in the United
States and Canada
In both Canada and the United States, offshore drilling is
managed by the federal government. However, Canada and the
United States employ significantly different approaches towards the
regulatory management of exploration, leasing, development, and
production of offshore oil and gas. Additionally, Canadian provinces
and American states have different rights to offshore seabed (or
subsurface) mineral rights. Exploration in Canadian Arctic waters is
also complicated by concurrent aboriginal rights and regulations.
Understanding these different features, as well as why the systems
developed in the manner that they have, is critical to effective
international management and resolution of offshore oil and gas
rights. This note uses the Beaufort Sea as an example of the practical
effect of these legal and regulatory differences.
A.
1.

The United States

U.S. Federal Law on Offshore Drilling (Rights)

The United States federal government has sovereign rights to the
seabed and subsurface of submerged lands97 beyond the three or nine
nautical mile state demarcation.98 In the United States, rights to
offshore natural resources are predominately governed99
by the
Submerged Lands Act ("SLA"), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act ("OCSLA"), the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
("FOGRMA"), and the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA").

97.

Exploration and Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 4 FED.
ADMIN. PRAC. § 4561 (3d ed.) (West, 2012).

98.

See Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/OuterContinental-Shelf/Index.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) [hereinafter

99.

See generally Robert B. Wiygul,
The Structure of Environmental
Regulation on the Outer Continental Shelf. Sources, Problems and the
Opportunity for Change, 12 J. ENERGYNAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 75
(1992); see also Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27,
1988) (proclaiming the territorial sea of the United States); see also
Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (proclaiming
the contiguous zone of the United States).

BOEM Jurisdiction].

a.

The Submerged Lands Act

State and federal rights to seabed minerals are defined by the
SLA. This law gave states the rights to any natural resources within
three nautical miles (or 3.45 land miles) from their coastlines. There
are two significant exceptions. Under the SLA, the rights of Texas
and Florida in the Gulf of Mexico were extended to nine nautical
miles (10.35 statute miles). 0 Beyond three (or nine) nautical miles,
the United States federal government possesses original title to
subsurface mineral rights.
b.

The Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act

Leasing and exploration of offshore oil and gas is controlled by the
over the Outer
OCSLA. In addition to codifying federal control'
0
the OCSLA also lays out a number of
Continental Shelf ("OCS"),"'
requirements for the Department of the Interior ("DOI"). First, it
requires the DOI to develop and maintain an oil and gas leasing
program structured in five-year increments. 03 Additionally, the
OCSLA requires agencies to consider "economic, social, and
environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable resources
contained in the outer Continental Shelf, and the potential impact of
oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the outer
and
human
coastal,
the
marine,
Continental
Shelf and

100.

U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OVERVIEW OF U.S.
LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING OFFSHORE NATURAL GAS
AND OIL ACTIVITY 4 (2005), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oilgas/natural_
[hereinafter EIA OFFgas/feature articles/2005/offshore/offshore.pdf
SHORE GUIDE]; see also BOEM Jurisdiction, supra note 98.

101.

See

ERIN MASTRANGELO,

ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
FRAMEWORK
DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL

GAS

33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND
available at
3 (2011),

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33404.pdf.
102. The OCSLA defines "continental shelf' differently than international
law. Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2012) ("The term 'outer Continental
Shelf means all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area
of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title,
and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and
are subject to its jurisdiction and control[.]") with United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS] ("The continental shelf of a coastal
State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental
margin does not extend up to that distance.").
103. See 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).

environments."'' 4 The OCSLA also requires the DOI to receive "fair
10 5
market value" for all leases on the OCS.
c.

The Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act

OCS leases are also governed by the FOGRMA.' °6 In response to
concerns that the DOI did not have sufficient accounting and
enforcement mechanisms,0 7 Congress enacted the FOGRMA to create
a "comprehensive system for determining, collecting and auditing all
fees and payments
for offshore leases in addition to conducting
inspections and enforcing penalties."'0 0
d.

The Coastal Zone Management Act

The CZMA109 was designed to encourage coordination and
cooperation between the federal and state governments by providing
for state-developed ocean resource plans as part of states' federally
approved coastal zone management programs."0 The CZMA requires
federal agency actions to "be carried out in a manner which is
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of approved State management programs.""' Essentially, this
means that federally permitted oil and gas exploration projects must
be submitted for state review." 2

104. Id. § 1344 (a)(1) (2012) (additional considerations for the "timing and
location of exploration, development and production of oil and gas" can
be found in §§ (2)(A)-(2)(H)).
105. But see VANN, supra note 101 at 11 ("Royalties may also be suspended
under certain conditions by BOEMRE pursuant to the Outer
Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act. . ."); see also 43
U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (currently no effective sections); see also Outer
Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, U.S. ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/oilgas/natural_gas/analysis_
publications/ngmajorleg/continental.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
106. 30 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2012).
107. Id. § 1701 (a)(2) (2012); see also EIA
8.
108. EIA
109.

OFFSHORE GUIDE,

OFFSHORE GUIDE,

supra note 100, at

supra note 100, at 8.

16 U.S.C. § 1452 (2012).

110. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 etseq. (2012).
Ill.

16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).

112. Id. § 1456(c); see also VANN, supra note 101, at 12 ("When a state
determines that a lessee's plan is inconsistent with its coastal zone
management program, the lessee must either reform its plan to
accommodate those objections and resubmit it for BOEMRE and state
approval or succeed in appealing the state's determination to the
Secretary of Commerce."); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.235 (2011).

2.

U.S. Regulatory Structure

Offshore oil drilling is managed by a number of different federal
agencies in the United States. Since many agencies have overlapping
authority at different stages of exploration and development, it may
be helpful to describe the division of authority in three general parts:
(1) leasing rights and licensing (for all stages of exploration and
development),
(2) environmental regulation, and (3) tort and labor
13
law.
a.

Leasing, Exploration andDevelopment

In the United States, there are four stages in the leasing process:
"(1) the five-year planning program; (2) preleasing activity and the
' 4
lease sale; (3) exploration; and (4) development and production."

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

("BOEM")" 5 is charged

with the development of the Five-Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Natural Gas Leasing Program ("OCS Leasing Program")" 6 that

implements the OCSLA.
b.

EnvironmentalRegulation

Federal agencies are charged with administering a number of
federal environmental laws in relation to offshore oil and gas
exploration and development, including the National Environmental
Policy Act," 7 Endangered

Species Act," 8 the Clean Water Act," 9 the

113. Tort and labor law will not be discussed in this note. For additional
information on personal injury and tort law on offshore oil and gas
facilities,
see Donald
T. Kramer, Annotation, Construction and
Application of § 4 of Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (43
U.S.C.A. § 1333), Relating to Laws Applicable to Subsoil and Seabed of Outer
Continental Shelf and Artificial Islands and Fixed Structures Erected
Thereon, 163 A.L.R. FED. §1 et seq. (2000).

114.

VANN, supra note 101

at 5.

115. Formerly known as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and also as the Minerals
Management Service (MMS). On Oct. 1, 2011, the BOEMRE was
reorganized and divided into the BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). See Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement, BOEMRE.GOv, http://www.
boemre.gov/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
116. See About
BOEM,
BUREAU
OF
OCEAN
ENERGY
MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 5,
2012).
117. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.
(2012).
118. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (2012).
119. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1294, et seq. (2012).

National Fishing Enhancement Act, 120 and the Oil Pollution Act. 121
These laws create directives for multiple agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior
Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Oceanic and Atmosphere
Administration, and BOEM in the regulation of offshore drilling
either in the initial environmental review or in the event of a disaster,
such as an oil spill. While the BOEM is required to release a
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement ("PEIS"), the agency
must also collaborate with other environmental regulators to develop
1 22
the PEIS.
At the time of writing, active leases have been granted to six
companies in the United States' portion of the Beaufort Sea. 123 While
further lease sales in the Beaufort Sea are planned, BOEM has
postponed additional auctions until 2017 in order to allow for
24
additional environmental review.
B.

Canada

In Canada, rights to and management of offshore natural
resources are governed by the Oceans Act, the Canada Petroleum
Resources Act, and the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act.'25
120. National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 33 U.S.C. § 2101, et seq.

(2012).
121. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. (2012).
122. SeePress Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, From Crisis to Reform:
Raising the Bar for Safety and Environmental Protection on Offshore
Oil
and
Gas
Operations
(Sept.
30,
2010),
available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/
getfile&PagelD=45793.
123. See, e.g.,

U.S.

CONTINENTAL

DEP'T
SHELF

OF THE
LEASE

INTERIOR, BEAUFORT
OWNERSHIP
(2011),

SEA-OUTER

available

at

http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEMNewsroom/Offsh
ore Stats andFacts/AlaskaRegion/Active%2Lease%2OMap%2OBea
ufort%20Sea%202011 .pdf.

124. See 2012-2017 Lease Sale Schedule,

BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,

http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/FiveYear-Program/Lease-Sale-Schedule/2012 ---2017-Lease-SaleSchedule.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) ("Beaufort Sea Sale 242 has
been postponed from 2015 to 2017 in recognition of the significant
overlapping of subsistence use, resource distribution, species habitat,
and to allow more time to analyze and implement our focused leasing
strategy in this area.").
125. Other Canadian federal laws may have limited applicability and
jurisdiction. Another way of looking at applicable federal law is to
identify which laws apply at different stages in the drilling process. The
PEW Environment Group created the following table that identifies the
relevant laws in each stage of exploration and development:
Figure 2: Five Phases of Canada's Arctic Offshore Hydrocarbon
System

1.

Canadian Federal Law on Offshore Drilling

In Canada, the federal government develops regulations, laws, and
policies for offshore drilling. Three laws predominately govern the title
to and exploration and development of offshore oil and gas. These are:
the Oceans Act, the Canada Petroleum Resources Act ("CPRA") and
the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act ("COGOA"). The Oceans
Act defines the territorial rights of the federal government and
provinces.'26
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LouIE PORTA & NIGEL BANKES, PEW ENVIR. GRP., BECOMING ARCTICREADY:
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
REFORMING
CANADA'S
APPROACH TO LICENSING AND REGULATING OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS IN

THE ARCTIC 4 (2011), available at http://www.pewenvironment.org/
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/PewOilGasReport web.pdf.
126. See Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31 (Can.).

management of Canadian federal exploration and production rights.
The CPRA also defines the royalty regime for oil and gas
exploitation.'27 The CPRA applies to both onshore and offshore
facilities. Finally, the COGOA governs the regulation of petroleum
operations.'28 In addition, it sets requirements for associated benefits
to territories and aboriginal groups in affected areas.
2.

Canadian Regulatory Structure

Canada does not have a uniform method of regulation and
division of responsibilities. Canadian regulation can best be described
by region. There are three major regions for offshore oil and gas in
Canada: the East Coast, the West Coast, and the Arctic. 29 Since the
East and West Coast regions have a longer history and the East
Coast region is more developed, their regulatory structure informs the
regulatory system and debate in the Arctic. Thus, it is important to
describe the regulatory structure of each region.
a.

East Coast

On the East Coast,13 ° regulation is divided between two regulatory
agencies: the Canada Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Board
("CNSOPB") and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore
Petroleum Board ("C-NLOPB"), which have authority offshore from
their respective provinces. 3 ' The CNSOPB is an independent joint
agency between the Canadian federal government and the Nova
Scotia provincial government. It was established in 1990 by the
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Accord Implementation
Acts.'32 Likewise, the C-NLOPB was established by mirror federal and
127. See, e.g.,
ANNUAL

ABORIGINAL AFF. AND N. DEV. CAN., NORTHERN OIL AND GAS
REPORT 2011
1 (2012), available at http://www.aadnc-

aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-TNTER-HQ/STAGING/textetext/nogann20l lpdf_ 1335968796614_eng.pdf.
128. Id.
129. See CAN.
AND

GAS

CTR. FOR ENERGY INFO.,
INDUSTRY 6-10 (2007),

CANADA'S

EVOLVING OFFSHORE OIL

available at http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/

DL/offshore/Reports/OffshoreFAMar2004

low.pdf

[hereinafter

CAN.

CTR. FOR ENERGY INFO. REPORT].

130. This includes

Hibernia, Terra Nova,

Whiterose, and Sable. See, e.g.,
2010 RESPONSIBLE
(2011), available at
http://www.capp.ca/getdoc.aspx?Docld=200577&DT=NTV.
CAN.
Assoc.
OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCERS, THE
CANADIAN ENERGY
2010 PROGRESS REPORT 18

131. See NAT'L ENERGY BD., ARCTIC OFFSHORE DRILLING REVIEW 6 (2011),
available at http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rpblctn/spchsndprsnttn/
201 1/rctcffshrdrllngrvw/rctcffshrdrllngrvw-eng.pdf
(a
geographic
representation of CNSOPB and C-NLOPB jurisdictions).
132. The Acts are actually two identical acts passed by the Canadian
Parliament and the Nova Scotia Legislature that were required to
implement the 1986 Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore petroleum Resources

214

provincial statutes'33 that implement the Atlantic Accord.' 3 4 One
region under the C-NLOPB, Hibernia, is also controlled by statute.135
The key features of the East Coast are: (1) the power-sharing
between the Canadian federal government and the provinces, and (2)
the delegation of authority to independent regulatory agencies that
have central control over the most significant issues, including worker
health and safety, environmental protection, and licensing for
exploration and development.'36 Additionally, unlike the United
States, royalties are collected by the provincial governments, not the
federal government.
b.

West Coast'37

Canadian federal government policy prohibits exploration and
development of any potential oil or gas resources off the coast of
British Columbia.'38 Accordingly, there is no regulatory structure for
the exploration and development of offshore oil and gas on the

Accord. See Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord,
1986,
available at
http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/sites/
Aug.
26,
Offshore
default/files/pdfs/Accord.pdf; see also Canada-Nova Scotia
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28
Petroleum Resources Accord
(Can.); Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Implementation Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 (Can.).
133. Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987,
Labrador Atlantic Accord
c.3. (Can.); Canada-Newfoundland and
Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-2
(Can.).
134. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of Canada
and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Oil
and Gas Resource Management and Revenue Sharing, Feb. 11, 1985,
available
at
http://w-ww.cnlopb.nl.ca/pdfs/guidelines/aa-mou.pdf
(commonly referred to as the "Atlantic Accord").
135. See Hibernia Development Project Act, S.C. 1990, c.41 (Can.).
136. See What We Do, CAN.-N.S. OFFSHORE PETROLEUM BD., http://
www.cnsopb.ns.ca/about-us/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
137. For an alternate geographic reference, the West Coast includes the
Georgia Basin, the Winona and Tofino Basin, and the Queen Charlotte
Basin. See MIN. OF ENERGY, MINES AND NAT. GAS, B.C.'s OFFSHORE OIL
AND GAS: A GUIDE TO THE GEOLOGY AND RESOURCES 2 (2003), available
at
http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geoscience/MapPlace/thematic
maps/OffshoreMapGallery/Documents/Petroleum-Brochure.pdf.
138. A common misconception is that a "moratorium" on exploration exists
pursuant to federal law. For a detailed history and explanation of the
development of Canadian offshore oil and gas law with respect to British
Columbia, see Review of the Federal Moratorium on Oil and Gas
Activities Offshore British Columbia, NAT. RESOURCES CAN. (Feb. 27,
2009),
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/sources/offshore-oil-gas/1265
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).

Canadian West Coast.'39 In the absence of a negotiated and developed
regulatory scheme for the West Coast, the Canadian National Energy
Board retains jurisdiction over seabed resources. 40
If Canadian federal policy did change, then a federal-provincial
agreement would have to be drafted and enabling legislation would
have to be passed by both the Canadian Parliament and the
provincial legislature in British Columbia.' 4' This would create a
similar regulatory structure to the one that already exists on the East
Coast. While the federal government has clear jurisdiction over
offshore resources, such a system of legislation and agreement is
required because of the overlapping federal and provincial authority
created by the Oceans Act, customary international law, and
international treaties.'4 2 Canada's current system of negotiated
agreements serves to preemptively settle disputes between the First
Nations, provinces, and the federal government. It also creates a less
fractured regulatory system.
c.

Arctic

Regulation in the Arctic region is more complex based on the
location of the particular oil or gas field. The northern-most portions
of the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin lay beneath the Northwest
Territories, while the Arctic Margin falls offshore the Northwest
Territories. The Arctic Cratonic largely falls beneath or offshore
Nunavut, although some portions extend into the Northwest
Territories.'4 3 Rights to and regulation of oil and gas deposits differs
based on the jurisdiction where the leases are obtained and where the
drilling is to occur.
i.

Northwest Territories

In the Northwest Territories, title and regulatory rights are in
transition between the federal government and the territorial
government. In February 2011, the Northwest Territories and the
Canadian federal government signed the Northwest Territories Lands
and Resources Devolution Agreement-in-Principle ("NWTAIP") to
139. Al Hudec and Van Penick, British Columbia Offshore Oil and Gas Law.
41 ALTA. L. REV. 101, 108 (2003); see also CAN. CTR. FOR ENERGY INFO.
REPORT,

140.

North /

supra note 129, at 23-24.
Offshore, NAT'L

ENERGY

BD.,

http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-

nsi/rthnb/nrthffshr/nrthffshr-eng.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) ("The
Board
(NEB
or the
Board) has regulatory
National Energy
responsibilities for oil and gas exploration and activities on frontier
lands not otherwise regulated under joint federal/provincial accords.").
141.

See Hudec & Van Penick, supra note 146, at 109.

142. Id.
143. CAN. CTR. FOR ENERGY INFO.

REPORT,

supra note 129, at 3.

transfer the rights and regulatory authority of oil and gas operations
in the Northwest Territories to the territorial government.'44 Whether
this process will be completed and when, however, remains unknown,
since an aboriginal group has challenged the validity of the NWTAIP
in both territorial and Canadian federal courts.145
Regulation also varies based on the sub-territorial region of the
Northwest Territories. However, offshore oil and gas largely exists in
two sub-territorial regions: the Beaufort Sea and the Inuvialuit
Settlement Region ("ISR").'4 6 Under the Inuvialuit Final Agreement
("IFA"),147 which governs the rights and interests between the

Canadian federal government and the Inuvialuit people, 48 the
Canadian federal government owns all rights and claims to offshore
subsurface oil and gas.' 49
However, until devolution is complete, the Canadian National
Energy Board ("NEB") and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development ("DAAND") possess regulatory jurisdiction
and authority over offshore oil and gas. 50 Like the United States, the
Canadian federal government divides the regulatory responsibilities
between the financial (including licensing) and the health, safety, and
144. Northwest Territories Lands and Resources Devolution Agreement-inPrinciple
pmbl.,
Feb.
26,
2011,
availableat
http://devolution.gov.nt.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DevoSignedAiPIRCNWTMN.pdf
("[T]he
Government of Canada is prepared to devolve to the Government of the
Northwest Territories . . . the legislative powers and responsibilities in

respect of the regulation of oil and gas operations in the Northwest
Territories currently administered by the National Energy Board under
the CanadaOil and Gas Operations Act.").
145.

See Sara Wilson, Lawsuit Launched Against Devolution, N. NEWS SERV.
(Feb.
6,
2012),
http://www.nnsl.com/frames/newspapers/201202/feb6_l2crtl.html.

146. See

ABORIGINAL AFF.
AND N. DEV. CAN.
ET AL.,
OIL AND GAS
APPROVALS IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES: INUVIALUIT SETTLEMENT

REGION (2001), available at http://www.oilandgasguides.com/guides
/nwt-isr/nwt-isr.pdf [hereinafter ISR GUIDE].
147. Id. at 75, §9.0 ("The Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) was signed by
all parties on June 5, 1984. It is a land claim agreement under
subsection 35(3) of the Constitution Act 1982. The IFA applies
throughout the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) and takes precedence
on all matters that it covers. To the extent of any inconsistency between
the IFA and any other federal, territorial or municipal law, the IFA
prevails to the extent of the inconsistency (IFA s. 3(3)). The legislation
implementing the Agreement is the Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims
Settlement Act, s.c. 1984, chp. 24.").
148. Id. at 17, §1.1.
149. Id. at 75, §9.0.
150. Id. at 23.

environmental aspects. The NEB regulates the safety, environmental,
conservation, and technical issues, while the DAAND regulates the
financial aspects. 5' Licensing is controlled by DAAND under the
CPRA.
ii. Yukon

The Yukon is one region where devolution has been completed for
onshore oil and gas.' 52 However, the Canadian federal government
retains the rights and responsibilities for offshore oil and gas.' 53 While
the federal government possesses the rights to offshore resources, the
1993 Canada-Yukon Oil and Gas Accord ("CYOGA") provided for "a
shared offshore management regime and revenue sharing arrangement
in the Beaufort Sea with [the] Yukon."'' 5 4
Like Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland and Labrador, the CYOGA provides for a joint
151.
Activity

Responsible Organization

Issuing Exploration Licences

Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development

Issuing Authorizations and
Approvals for wells

National Energy Board

Issuing Significant Discovery
Declarations

National Energy Board

Issuing Commercial Discovery
Declarations

National Energy Board

Issuing Significant Discovery
Licences

Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development

Issuing Production Licences

Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development

Managing royalties from oil and
gas production

Department of Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development

NAT'L ENERGY BD.. REVIEW OF OFFSHORE DRILLING IN THE CANADIAN
ARCTIC
17 (2011),
available at http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-

nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/rctcffshrdrllngrvw/fnlrprt2O 11 /fnlrprt20 11 eng.pdf.
152. See, e.g.,

ABORIGINAL
APPROVALS IN THE

AFF. AND N. DEV.
BEAUFORT SEA

CAN.

ET AL.,

OIL AND

GAS

§ 11-7 (2002),
available at
http://www.oilandgasguides.com/guides/nwt-bft/nwt-bft.pdf.
153.

See Roles and Responsibilities of
Offshore Areas, YUKON

GOV'T,

Governments: Federal Government:

http://www.emr.gov.yk.ca/oilandgas/

roles responsibilities.html#top (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
154. Canada-Yukon Oil and Gas Accord Implementation Act, c. 5, s. 20
(1998) (Can.).

Federal-Territorial Offshore Committee. However, that committee
functions as only "a consultative mechanism on administrative and
policy decisions and issues affecting the offshore"' 55 and does not
possess the broad regulatory powers found in the Canadian-provincial
regulatory boards.
iii. Nunavut

As in the Northwest Territories, the Canadian federal government
owns title to offshore oil and gas, and is responsible for the
administration and regulation of those rights. However, disagreements
between the federal government and Nunavut organizations over
control of non-renewable resources have increased the ambiguity as to
who has title to and who may regulate oil and gas in Nunavut 56
These issues may be resolved by devolution. Like the Northwest
Territories, Nunavut has recently begun the process for devolution in
2012, with the federal government's selection of a negotiator.'57
However, until this process is complete, the federal government will
be responsible for the determination and administration of offshore oil
and gas rights.
C.

DistinctionsBetween United States & Canada

Administrative Management of Offshore Resources

1.

While offshore oil and gas is controlled by the federal government
in both Canada and the United States, the two nations employ
significantly different regulatory regimes. The two systems can
generally be characterized by one feature: the development of a new
regulatory structure for each geographic area, such as in Canada, or
the use of existing regulatory agencies to implement policy across
multiple geographic areas, such as in the United States. Neither
system is perfect and both come with their respective strengths and
155.

THE ROLE OF THE PROVINCIAL AND
FISHERIES AND
OCEANS CAN.,
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE OCEANS SECTOR 14 (2009), available

at

http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/pg-gp/pdf/pg-gp-

eng.pdf.
156. See Jerome D. Davis, Kamrul Hossain, & Timo Koivurova, Canadian
Energy
Arctic Offshore
Oil and Gas and European Union
Diversification: Towards a New Perspective?, in UNDERSTANDING AND
STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN UNION-CANADA RELATIONS IN LAW OF THE
at
244
(2009),
available
OCEAN
GOVERNANCE
SEA
AND

http://law.dal.ca/Files/MELInstitute/Reports/JL35_rmanuscript
hout chapter_ 6.pdf.

wit

157. See, e.g., Nunavut to Begin Devolution Talks: Federal government
appoints Dale Drown as negotiator, CBC NEWS (May 23, 2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2012/05/23/northto Begin
[hereinafter Nunavut
nunavut-devolution-negotiator.html
Devolution Talks].

219

limitations. Canada's more unitary regulatory system allows
companies to deal with, predominately, a single regulator and specific
regulations based on the needs and interests of that area. By contrast,
the United States regulatory framework is more difficult to
understand, as multiple agencies may promulgate overlapping
regulations with unclear authority at specific offshore sites.
However, the United States' system also allows for decisionmaking to be based on a wider range of federal and state agency
information and resources. This is particularly important in assessing
the environmental impact of offshore activity, which requires greater
resources and expertise.
2.

Revenue Sharing

One significant consequence of the Canadian joint federalprovincial agreement
and regulatory
structure is that fewer
intergovernmental
conflicts
exist
regarding
collection
and
disbursement of oil and gas revenues. In the United States, debate
over the division of offshore oil and gas revenues has been the subject
of decades worth of litigation 58, legislation,' 59 and debate that
continues to this day. 60 Despite recent federal legislation, including
the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, which directed 37.5%
of federal revenues from OCS leases to neighboring states, 6' governors
continue to lobby for an increased share of federal OCS revenues. 62
158. SeeTexas v. Sec'y of the Interior, 580 F. Supp. 1197, 1208 (E.D. Tex.
1984); seealso State of Alabama v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 84 F.3d 410
(11th Cir. 1996).
159. See Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, 43 U.S.C. § 1331; see
also Edward
A.
Fitzgerald,
The
Seaweed Rebellion: FederalState/Provincial Conflicts Over Offshore Energy Development in the United
States, Canadaand Australia, 7 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 255, 275-280 (1992).
160. See Steve Contorno, Virginia Senators Buck Obama on Offshore
Drilling, WASH. EXAMINER (July 26, 2012) http://washingtonexaminer
.con/virginia-senators-buck-obama-on-offshoredrilling/article/2503270#.
UKAKVmfea70; see also Zack Colman, Bingaman Exit Could Help Gulf
States Get More Offshore Drilling Royalties, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://thehill.comblogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/247985-bingaman-exit-couldhelp-gulf-states-get-more-offshore-drilling-royalties.
161.

See NAT.

RESOURCES

COMM.,

Full

Committee

to Hold Hearing on

Offshore Energy Revenue Sharing, U.S.
H.R.
(July 19,
2011),
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Document
ID=252620.
162.

See, e.g., Letter from Gov. Robert J. Bentley, Alabama, et al. to Jeff

Bingaman, Chairman, and Lisa Murkowski, Ranking Member, Sen.
Comm. on Energy and Nat. Resources (July 21, 2011), available at
http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell-media/resources-files/ocs-revenue-shar

ing letter.pdf.

Part of the issue appears to stem from the fact that the United
States federal government is responsible for collecting offshore oil and
gas royalties and distributing these revenues to the states. In contrast,
Canadian provincial governments collect royalties and distribute these
revenues according to pre-arranged federal-provincial agreements.'63
At first glance, federal-state conflicts may appear to be of little
import for industry because federal and state governments are only
disputing who gets what share of a set proportion from the company's
lease. However, the American federal-state discord may have real
effects on the issuance of oil and gas exploration licenses and leases if
states attempt to block leases under the CZMA because they feel that
the proportion of royalties they receive is not equitable.' 64 Such
conflict is less likely under the Canadian administrative and
regulatory system.
3.

The Beaufort Sea Example

One geographic area where regulatory differences may have a
discreet effect is in the Beaufort Sea. 65 If this offshore area falls under
American jurisdiction, then development and leasing will almost
certainly be delayed until 2017. However, if this area falls under
Canadian control, then development and leasing may occur on a
faster timetable, as Canada has already authorized exploratory
licenses in several offshore areas in the Beaufort Sea.166 This has the
potential to greatly advance the production and end-consumer
timetable for offshore resources in the short and mid-term

163. The provincial governments of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova
Scotia collect royalties - the "owner's share" of production. Under
legislated agreements called accords, between the federal government
and the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador, the
royalties are set and collected by the provinces as if the wells were
located on land. . . . This approach allows the investor to recover much
of the initial investment before paying an increasing share of revenues in
royalties to the provinces.
CAN. CTR. FOR ENERGY INFO. REPORT, supra note

164.

129, at 5.

See Richard Slawsky, Blanco Bucks Lopsided Fed Royalty Plan, 25 NEW
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS 1, 55 (2004); see also Letter from Gov. Kathleen

Babineaux Blanco, Louisiana, to Renee Orr, Chief, Leasing Division,
Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (June 14,
2006),

available

at

http://www.blancogovemor.com/assets/docs/

newsrelated/MMS%200CS%20Lease%2Sale%2OLetter%2006-142006.pdf.

165. See infra section IV.A and accompanying text
national claims in the Beaufort Sea.

for a description of

166. See, e.g., Robert Wright, Arctic: Ice Cap Region Offers Cold Comfort for
Oil Explorers, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.ft.com/

cms/s/0/e3434d84-28 1e- 11 e2-afd2-00144feabdc0.html.

(approximately through 2027).167 Interestingly, there are likely to be
no economies of scale or efficiency' 68 increases based on either
American or Canadian regulatory management of these resources.
This is due to two factors: (1) the highly erratic environmental
conditions,'69 such as ice flows, 7 ' and (2) the specialized nature of
drilling equipment and limited number of ships or mobile rigs that
can safely and feasibly extract these resources. 7 '
One regulatory area with the potential to have a significant
impact on the exploration and development timeline in the American
and Canadian sections of the Beaufort Sea is environmental
regulation. While a detailed analysis of these differences is beyond the
scope of this note, it is important to consider Executive Order
12114,172 which allows United States federal agencies to consider
foreign laws and regulations in related American environmental
decisions and documents.' 73 This suggests that despite different
regulatory regimes and claims, cooperation is possible that would
allow for the efficient and effective development of offshore resources
by both the United States and Canada.

167.

See LN CALLOW, ABORIGINAL AFF. AND N. DEV. CAN., BEAUFORT REG'L
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, OIL
AND
GAS
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITY FORECAST: CANADIAN BEAUFORT SEA 2012-2027
(2012),

available at http://www.beaufortrea.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
Beaufort-Sea-OG-activity-forecast-2012-201 7.pdf.
168. This is likely true even in regards to efficiencies in applying for multiple
leases simultaneously, as highly localized environmental data must be
developed for each lease area. Furthermore, the United States and
Canada have clear jurisdiction over individual areas of the Beaufort Sea,
suggesting that any company wishing to expand operations in the
Beaufort Sea will likely be required to deal with both governments and
regulatory systems, in any event.
169.

See, e.g., Press Release,

Royal Dutch Shell, Royal Dutch Shell Alaska

Drilling Update (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.shell.com/home/content/
media/newsand media releases/2012/alaska drillingupdate_17092
012.html.
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 166.
172. Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, Exec. Order
No. 12114, 44 C.F.R. 1957 (1979).
173. See Joan M. Malik, United States Environmental Law Applied in the Arctic
Ocean: Frustrating the Balance of the Law of the Sea, NationalSovereignty,
and International Collaboration Efforts, 60 NAVAL L. REV.
41, 47 (2010).

IV. Mechanisms for Resolution: Diplomacy and
Otherwise
As the ice melts and resources become readily accessible, states
are looking to stake their claim and reap the financial benefits. Often
characterized as the "race" or "scramble" for resources,1 4 Arctic
States with direct and indirect claims are portrayed as rats vying for
a piece of the almighty cheese. But while Russia has planted a flag in
the North Pole seabed,'75 and China's Snow Dragonicebreaker has set
sail,' 76 Canada and the United States are shying away from these
overt and ostentatious actions. Rather, Canada and the United States
are following the appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms outlined
in the UN Charter and the UNCLOS to resolve a potentially multibillion dollar contested area: the Beaufort Sea.
Under these agreements, party-states must utilize "peaceful
means" in resolving disputes.' 77 Peaceful means may involve any
number of enumerated possibilities, including the use of diplomatic
endeavors as well as more adversarial, international judiciaries.'78
While international judiciaries such as the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ"), 17 9 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
("ITLOS"), 8 ° and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf ("CLCS"), 18 ' may produce clear and "binding" resolutions,'82

174. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Race is on as Ice Melt Reveals Arctic
Treasures, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012

/09/1 9/science/earth/arctic-resources-exposed-by-warming-set-offMelting
Chris Arsenault,
competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
Arctic Heats up Resource Scramble, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:54

AM),

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201291613

3717451622.html; Charles M. Sennott, Polar Race: The Scramblefor
Resources is On, BOISE WEEKLY (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.boise

weekly.com/boise/polar-race-the-scramble-for-arctic-resources-ison/Content?oid=2750830&storyPage=l.
175. See Russia Plants Flag Under North Pole, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2007,
5:22 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm.
176. See China's 'Snow Dragon' Icebreaker Ship Becomes First Chinese

Vessel to Cross Arctic Ocean, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2012, 5:59
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/china-snow-dragonicebreaker n_1918260.html.
177. U.N. Charter, art. 33, para. 1; UNCLOS, supra note 102, art. 279.
178. See U.N. Charter, supra note 177, art. 33, para. 1.
179. See INT'L COURT OF
visited Apr. 6, 2013).
180. See

INT'L TRIB. FOR

JUST.,

THE

L.

http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/ (last
OF THE SEA,

http://www.itlos.org/ (last

visited Apr. 6, 2013).
181. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. DIv. FOR
OCEANS & L. OF THE SEA, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/

often the joint diplomatic endeavors produce the most financially
advantageous and amicable results.
This section will use the disputed Beaufort Sea area as a case
study to illustrate the beneficial impact of not just engaging
international judiciaries but doing so while maintaining joint
diplomatic ventures. Canada and the United States, by sharing the
longest undefended border in the world,' 83 have a uniquely amicable
relationship and bring these relations to dispute resolution through
their execution of bilateral agreements, pursuit of joint initiatives, and
participation in specialized organizations. However, mere diplomacy is
limited and Canada will rightly pursue answers from the CLCS to
better clarify the conflict. Yet Canada's pursuit for answers is still
peppered with diplomatic engagements, and thus in effect, the United
States and Canada will see financial and diplomatic returns,
regardless of who "wins the race."
A.

Beaufort Sea Dispute

The Beaufort Sea is located northeast of Alaska and due north of
Canada. It extends out into the Arctic Ocean approximately 476,000
sq. km. (184,000 sq. mi.). 18 4 Of these 476,000 sq. km., approximately
just over 21,000 sq. km. (6,250 sq. mi.) are in dispute.185
At the heart of the disagreement is the 1825 Convention between
Great Britain and Russia Concerning the Limits of their Respective
Possessions on the Northwest Coast of America and the Navigation of
the Pacific Ocean ("1825 Convention") .86 The 1825 Convention

clcs home.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); see also UNCLOS,

supra

note 102, Annex 1I(providing the CLCS's statute and jurisdiction).
182. The term "binding" is used loosely in international law. The United
Nations' international judiciaries are often criticized for their lack of
effective policing mechanisms beyond economic sanctions. However, this
criticism is usually triggered in criminal contexts. In relation to the
topics at issue in this article, economic sanctions have proven
particularly effective.
183. While many have indicated that the Beyond the Border Initiative and
other post-September 11 national security endeavors at the United
States-Canada border indicate the contrary, it is generally accepted that
the border between the United States and Canada is undefended.
184. Simone Lewis-Koshkinen, U.S.-CanadaDispute over Offshore Territory, ICE
CASE STUDIES (Dec.
13, 2010), http://wwwl.american.edu/ted/ice/
BEAUCANUS.htm.
185.

See DONALD ROTHWELL, CAN. INST. OF RESOURCES LAW,
BOUNDARIES
AND
RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT:
OPTIONS

MARITIME
FOR
THE

5 (1988) (providing the map located at Figure
illustrating Canadian and the American claims to the Beaufort Sea).
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186. Convention Between Great Britain and Russia Concerning the Limits of
their Respective Possessions on the Northwest Coast of America and the

between Great Britain and Russia ceded present-day Alaska to
Russia,'87 and in 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the United States.'88 The
1825 Convention set the eastern border of Alaska and the western
border of the Yukon at the "meridian line of the 141st degree, in its
prolongation as far as the frozen ocean."' 89 Canada and the United
States interpret this designation very differently.
Canada claims, as clearly stated in the 1825 Convention, that
both its land and maritime boundary follows the 141st meridian
line. 9 ° This would indicate that the border between Alaska and
Canada extends along that meridian line and ocean area existing
within the permissible nautical miles east of that border, as per the
UNCLOS, would fall under Canadian control.
The United States disagrees with Canada and claims that "as far
as the frozen ocean" means that the boundary follows the 141st
meridian only as far as the land or baseline, and that ocean beyond
The
the baseline must fall under customary international law.'
United States comes to this conclusion by looking to international
caselaw and the equidistance principle. Under the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.), the ICJ held that, as dictated by
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,'92 equitable
principles should guide boundary disputes when the two states are
separated by sea.' 93 Thus under the interpretation of the United
States, each states' claim should be split equidistant from the
arc (21,000 sq.
opposing coastlines, which would create an extended
94
km. or 6,250 sq. mi.) across the 141st meridian.
Procedures enumerated in the UN Charter and the UNCLOS
provide a multitude of non-mutually exclusive options for Canada and
the United States to utilize. The following sections will explore some
of the more applicable diplomatic and adversarial mechanisms
provided. Then these applicable mechanisms, when applied to the
Beaufort Sea dispute and used in conjunction, will show how both
Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, Gr. Brit.-Russ., Feb. 16, 1825, 75
C.T.S. 95 [hereinafter 1825 Convention].
187. Id.

188. See Treaty with Russia for the Purchase of Alaska, U.S.-Russ., Mar. 30,
1867, 15 Stat. 539.
189. 1825 Convention, supra note 186, art. III.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Lewis-Koshkinen, supra note 184.
192. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S.

311.
193. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
194. Id.

Canada and the United States
success in the Arctic region.
B.

can see financial

and diplomatic

Applicable Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

While some scholars have called for the creation of a new "Arctic
Treaty," the existing frameworks and mechanisms provide sufficient
guidance.'95 Moreover, the Arctic States, in the Ilulissat Declaration,
have affirmed their sole reliance on the existing frameworks.' 96 Thus
Arctic States will rely on the UNCLOS as it is the most prevalent
framework in allocating ownership in the Arctic region. 97 While the
United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, its actions indicate that
it accepts it as customary international law and will abide by its
provisions since the UNCLOS will protect its economic interests in
the Beaufort Sea.'98
Through UNCLOS Article 279, as per Article 33(1) of the UN
Charter, "[t]he parties to any dispute . . . shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
195. See

A
ROBERT HUEBERT & BROOKS B. YEAGER, WORLD WILD. FUND,
NEW SEA: THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON MANAGEMENT
AND CONSERVATION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 24 (2008);

see also Ed Struzik, As the Far North Melts, Calls Grow for Arctic
14,
2010),
ENVIR.
360
(June
Treaty,

http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as-the-far northmeltscalls grow-for
_arctic_treaty/2281/; seealso Hans H. Hertell, Note, Arctic Melt: The
Tipping Point for an Arctic Treaty, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 565
(2009) (advocating for a regional treaty to deal with issues emerging
from the Arctic Melt). C.f John B. Bellinger, Treaty on Ice, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com!2008/06/23/opinion
/23bellinger.html?pagewanted=print (explaining how an Arctic Treaty
is unnecessary).
196. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION (May 28, 2008),
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_
available
at
provides
for important rights
and
Declaration.pdf ("[UNCLOS]
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the
continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including
ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and
other uses of the sea. [Canada, Russia, Denmark, Norway, and the
United States] remain committed to this legal framework and to the
[emphasis
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims."
added]).
197. A simple search of reputable law journals and government reports
illustrates the consistent use of UNCLOS as the primary tool in
evaluating sovereign claims to Arctic resources.
198.

See, e.g., Betsy Baker, Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory
Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea, 34 VT. L.
REV. 57, 64-70 (2009) (stating that while the United States has yet to
ratify the UNCLOS, it has made piecemeal overtures to indicate that it
accepts the necessary provisions as customary international law).

other peaceful means of their own choice."' 99 This provision provides
states parties with great flexibility in resolving disputes with some
options more effective than others. In the following sections, the
applicable mechanisms to this case study are divided into two
avenues for dispute resolution: diplomacy and judicial
disparate
intervention. While all available mechanisms are peaceful measures,
some are more adversarial than others. By understanding the
strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism, upon their application,
it will be seen that a multi-faceted approach will produce the best
results.
1.

Diplomacy: Specialized Organizations, Agreements and Joint
Endeavors

and joint
agreements,
Specialized organizations, bilateral
initiatives born out of the Arctic States' needs have emerged to
address the shifting concerns and interests in the Arctic region.20 The
following sections will introduce the Arctic Council, the Conference of
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, and the joint missions to
gather data in Arctic waters. Together, these initiatives comprise the
core diplomatic mechanisms at play in resolving the Arctic disputes
between Canada and the United States. These particular diplomatic
mechanisms will serve to provide an important compliment to the
more adversarial methods later discussed.
a.

Arctic Council

Out of numerous discussions between the Arctic States, the Arctic
Council was formed in 1996.11 The Arctic Council acts as a forum for
states with direct and indirect claims and interests in the Arctic
region to participate in working groups and potentially affect Arctic
policy.20 2 It is the only body that acknowledges not just states with
direct claims, but those with indirect economic interests as well.

199. U.N. Charter, supra note 177, art. 33, para. 1; UNCLOS, supra note
102, art. 279.
200. See Christopher C. Joyner, The Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean, 18
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 200 (2009) ("While the [UNCLOS] is
central to articulating rules for using the Arctic Ocean, two key points
must be realized: first, there is already in place a diverse series of
international agreements pertaining to ocean space in general, which can

be applied to the Arctic

in particular; and second, these and other

instruments actually function as parts of a larger, more multifaceted
legal regime for regulating human activities in Arctic Ocean space.").
201. See History, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.
php/en/about-us/history (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
202. See About the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited Apr., 6, 2013).

Although eight states comprise the Arctic Council's Member States,2" 3
only Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark, and Norway have
direct claims to the mineral resources as each border the Arctic
Ocean. Indigenous groups, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council,
also have a presence as Permanent Participants." Additionally, many
European states have Permanent Observer status20 5 and even China
has a presence as an ad hoc observer state.0 6
The Arctic Council, however, has been criticized for lacking any
real power in the region. By traditional definitions, it is not an
"international organization" since a treaty mandate does not bind its
members.20 7 Without a treaty mandate or centralized secretariat, the
Arctic Council lacks an enforcement mechanism and therefore its
states' mere consensus determines action. While the Arctic Council
was able to garner enough consensus to produce its first and only
binding document in 2011, the Arctic Search and Rescue
Agreement, 20 it has yet to produce any other binding document to
address the multitude of identified issues. To combat this shortcoming
and appearance of ineffectiveness, in September 2012 the Arctic
Council's Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic
203. See

Member
States,
ARCTIC
COUNCIL,
http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/members (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).

204. See Permanent Participants,
ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanentparticipants (last
visited
Apr. 6, 2013).
205. See id.
206. See id. China
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has made significant overtures to secure its interest in the
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[hereinafter SCPAR
PROPOSAL] (stating that since the Arctic Council lacks a treaty
mandate, it lacks effectiveness as a true international organization).
208. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue in the Arctic, May 12, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 1119; see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search
and Rescue Agreement with Other Arctic Nations (May 12, 2011),
availableat http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/201 1/05/163285.htm.

Region published its "Arctic Governance in an Evolving Arctic
Region" report. 09 This report provides several proposals to increase
the Arctic Council's effectiveness in the region. 10° However, these
recommendations could take years to implement and these changes
require stable funding, which is a problem for the Arctic Council in
and of itself."'
b.

Joint Endeavors

In 2008, the Canada-United States Arctic discourse shifted. Prior
to 2008, Canada and the United States solely utilized independent
initiatives to collect data in the Arctic: Natural Resources Canada
and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 212 and the Continental Shelf
Project in the United States. 213 But in 2008, Canada and the United
States realized that collaboration would mutually benefit their Arctic
goals and the USCGC Healy and the CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent
embarked on the first joint mission to map the Arctic Ocean.2 1 4 The
vessels would meet again in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to map over 100,000
sq. mi. of the Arctic Ocean and collect over nine thousand miles of
seismic data, 215 with plans to continue. 216 But why cooperate? What is
the incentive?
First, neither the United States nor Canada possess the necessary
equipment to independently map the Arctic. One icebreaker alone can

209. SCPAR PROPOSAL, supra note 207.
210. See id. at 2-13.

211. See id. The report advises the Arctic Council to restrict leadership to
only the eight Member States regardless of the money and influence
China and the European Union are trying to impart. But generally, this
report discusses the SCPAR's concern that the Arctic Council's
infrastructure needs to be re-designed in order to be effective. For
example, the Arctic Council needs stabilize funding, a centralized
secretariat, and a proper treaty mandate to facilitate new, binding
multilateral agreements.
212. See Canada's Program,
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http://www.international.gc.ca/continental/program-canadaprogramme.aspx?view=d (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
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(last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
214. See id.
215. U.S.-Canada Arctic Ocean Survey Partnership Saved Costs, Increased Data,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
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15, 2011), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/
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CONT'L SHELF PROJECT, supra

note 213.
216. See id. Starting in 2012, Canada and the United States also embarked
on a joint mission to map areas of the Atlantic Ocean.

cost close to eight hundred million dollars,217 and two are needed to
collect the extensive bathymetric and seismic reflection data."' The
United States currently has one medium-sized icebreaker, the USCGC
Healy, which can only collect bathymetric data.21 9 Canada was in a
similar situation since the CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent could only
collect seismic data. 2 Starting in July 2007, Canada and the United
States began discussing how to resolve their obstacles in a mutually
beneficial way. 21 Bringing both icebreakers together would produce
the needed data that could serve to support the other's continental
shelf claims. Canada and the United States embarked on four joint
missions to map the Arctic Ocean. 222 In conducting these joint
missions, Canada and the United States have saved hundreds of
millions of dollars and collected substantial results. 23 On April 27,
2012, at the International Polar Year conference, both states agreed
to continue these endeavors while seeking new ways to collaborate in
the future.2 24 Notably, both Canada and the United States vowed to
"[e]ncourage closer collaboration among current scientific research and
'
environmental assessment efforts across the Beaufort Sea region. "225
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224. Press Release, U.S. Arctic Res. Comm'n, U.S. and Canadian Arctic
Commissions Establish Collaborative Path Forward (May 7, 2012),
availableat http://www.arctic.gov/news/05-07-12.pdf.
225. Id.

2.

Pertinent Judicial Measure: UNCLOS Article 76:

CLCS

26

The UNCLOS allows international judiciaries such as the ICJ and
the ITLOS to resolve states parties' disputes. Since the Beaufort Sea case
study deals primarily with the continental shelf determination, this
section will focus on the CLCS; Canada will utilize the CLCS to evaluate
the Beaufort Sea dispute no later than December 2013. To best
understand how Canada is utilizing this mechanism, this section will
explore the international law at issue, the CLCS's jurisdiction over a
dispute, the process the CLCS employs in evaluating submitted proposals
for continental shelf extensions, and the effect of its decisions.
UNCLOS Article 76(1) defines the continental shelf to include
both the "seabed and subsoil" that extends beyond the territorial sea
marker (the state's baseline) of twelve nautical miles so as to
guarantee "a distance of 200 nautical miles . . . measured [beyond the
'
territorial waters]." 227
States can exercise exclusive sovereign rights
over exploring and exploiting the resources of the continental shelf
within the two hundred nautical mile boundary even if the shelf does
not extend to that distance. 28 States can even request an extension of
the two hundred nautical mile limitation by submitting a proposal to
the CLCS.
The CLCS was established to "make recommendations to coastal
States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of
'
their continental shelf."229
States have ten years from the date it signs
the UNCLOS to utilize the CLCS.230 The coastal state petitioning the
CLCS must provide "charts and relevant information, including
geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits of the
continental shelf."23'
However, the CLCS will not automatically
evaluate a proposal if the area is in dispute and certain procedures
must be followed by the petitioner in these situations in order for the
CLCS to evaluate the proposal. Ultimately, the CLCS recognizes that
resolving matters in dispute in connection with establishing the outer
limits of the continental shelf rests with states. Thus the CLCS
promotes the use of diplomatic measures prior to and postrecommendation. However once the recommendation is made, it is
final and binding.232
226.

Anna Cavner, Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf- Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor, 42 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 387 (2009).

227. UNCLOS, supra note 102, art. 76(1).
228. Id., arts. 76(1) & 77(1).
229. Id., Annex II & art. 76(8).
230. Id., Annex II, art. 4.
231. Id., art. 76(9).
232. Id.at art. 76(8).

C.

Two Methods Are Better Than One

Canada and the United States are doing exactly what should be
done to resolve the Beaufort Sea dispute. Diplomacy proliferates
relationships and seemingly fosters a collaborative environment that
cost-effectively produces valuable information, but it merely provides
a forum with no real resolutions. Resolution through pure diplomacy
is especially hard to reach when billions of dollars in resources are at
stake. Additionally, as seen in the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine case, Canada and the United States
are accustomed to resolving their maritime disputes in court. 33 So in
keeping in line with the accepted frameworks (UNCLOS) and
historical approach to resolving their maritime disputes, it comes as
no surprise that Canada is utilizing the CLCS, regardless of it
appearing adversarial.
Canada's actions may not further its
diplomatic relations with the United States, but as seen by the states'
numerous joint endeavors, it has not hindered them.
The CLCS and the process outlined in Article 76 of the UNCLOS
is crucial in determining rights to the Beaufort Sea and other
contested areas in the Arctic. Under Article 76, states that have
ratified the UNCLOS have ten years from the date of ratification to
submit a claim for continental shelf extension beyond the two
hundred nautical mile limit.234 As of November 2012, Canada was in
the final stages of preparing its submission.2 11 Canada has spent in the
upwards of fifty-one million dollars alone to map the Arctic seabed
and gather the proper data for such a monumental claim. 236 Even
though jointly-mapping the Arctic Ocean saved Canada and the
United States an undocumented, but presumably large, amount of
money, tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars were spent in
supporting the icebreakers and maintaining the annual missions.
Once Canada submits its claim for an extended continental shelf,
comprised of data gained in its joint-missions with the United States,
the CLCS will notify the United States of the submission. This is
required because the Beaufort Sea is technically disputed. 237 The
United States will then have ninety days to reply or object with the
research and data it gained during its joint-missions with Canada.
233. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.),
1982 I.C.J. 560.
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This process provides the needed consent for the CLCS to proceed in
considering Canada's submission. Upon receiving all necessary
information,
the
CLCS will make a final and
binding
recommendation.2 38 Further, as seen by Canada and the United States
abiding by the ICJ ruling in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in

the Gulf of Maine, the parties will cooperate. But will the CLCS
recommendation even matter? Will Canada and the United States not
see significant riches regardless of who "wins"?
With approximately "1.7bn cubic metres of gas and over lbn
cubic metres of oil" available in the disputed area of the Beaufort
Sea,239 the moratorium on offshore drilling exploration and bidding
has been somewhat lifted.2 41 While Canada has yet to permit off-shore
exploration pending its National Energy Board's review, 241 the United
States Department of the Interior permitted Shell to conduct
exploratory drilling and begin construction of its first well in the
Arctic by allowing "as much as 1,400 feet of well casing to support
the required blowout preventer, a device meant to shut down a
runaway well. '242 However, Shell ran into problems and has
abandoned its efforts until late 2013.23 Therefore, regardless of
Canada's impending submission and the United States' eagerness to
"drill baby drill," Canada and the United States are moving forward
and will see significant gains regardless of the CLCS's determinations
in the coming years. The true limiter of Canada's claims may not be
the United States, but rather its aboriginal populations.

238. UNCLOS, supra note 102, art. 76(8).
239. Sian Griffiths, US-Canada Arctic Border Dispute Key to Maritime
Riches, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2010, 5:34 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-us-canada- 10834006.

240. See Juliet Eilperin & Anne E. Kornblut, President Obama Opens New Area
to Offshore
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an
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summary of the offshore drilling and energy exploration in the United
States over the past two years).
243. See Kim Murphy, Drill Rigs Wind Up Operations in Arctic Alaska Seas,

L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/31/
nation/la-na-nn-arctic-drill-alaska-20121031 (providing a brief overview
of the wrap-up involved in the Shell endeavor).

V.

Conflicting Nunavut Claims

The application of Canada's regulatory paradigm for resource
exploration, development, and extraction in its Arctic territory should
simply entail the application of Canada's existing federal law for
regulating the implicated industries and activities. However, because
of the fairly recent creation of Nunavut and its grant of semiautonomy as a distinct, aboriginally administered federal territory,
the regulatory environment in most of the Canadian Arctic is quite
complicated. In some areas, such as on-site activities for deep water
exploration for and extraction of oil and gas, it is clear that federal
regulations, and only federal regulations, apply.
Overlap and ambiguity in the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
Act ("NLCAA") 244 create several emerging legal conflicts between the
regulatory powers of Nunavut and the Canadian federal government.
These conflicts could jeopardize permitting the regulation of any landbased exploration or land-based support for deep water development.
Also, because of several disagreements
regarding the ongoing
devolution of powers from the federal government to the Nunavut
territorial government, the possibility of significant legal and policy
conflicts exist in the near future. The most important of these issues
is federal-versus-territorial jurisdiction over the internal waters of the
Canadian Archipelago. Yet Canada, building on previous initiatives
with its eastern provinces regarding offshore resource management,
has a workable solution to its current legal conundrum.
A.

Anthropologicaland Legal History of Nunavut

What
is now known as the Canadian Archipelago has been
continuously inhabited by aboriginal peoples of the Tunit, Thule, and
Inuit ethnic groups for at least four thousand years.145 The
descendants of the Intuit make up over ninety-five percent of
Nunavut's current demographic. 46 The Inuit continue to base their
economy largely off of subsistence hunting and gathering, as they
have for centuries. 247 Europeans first visited and likely settled in the
Archipelago as early as 1000 CE,248 with the first recorded European
244.
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exploration making landfall in the Archipelago in 1576 when English
explorer Martin Frobisher
claimed what would become Baffin Island
249
Britain.
Great
for
With Canada's assertion of independence from Great Britain, the
Canadian Archipelago became part of the Northwest Territories, and
was administered as such for most of the twentieth century. At first,
most of the Arctic's inhabitants lived in settlements on the
northernmost shores of the continent and the southern shores of the
Archipelago's lower islands. Subsequently, several Inuit communities
were moved northwards as Canada sought to reinforce its sovereignty
in the high Arctic. 25 ° Combined with population growth and the aid of
modem technology, this push northwards has allowed Inuit
settlements throughout the lower half of the Archipelago.25
In the mid-1970's, the umbrella Inuit association in Canada, the
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, began exploring the possibility of a new land
claim agreement to create an Inuit Territory separate from the
Northwest Territories. 2 2 A plebiscite in 1982 authorized such a split,
and in 1993, the NLCAA was passed by Canadian Parliament. 253 The
transfer of rights and governance from the Northwest Territories to
Nunavut was completed in 1999.254 However, the process of rights
devolution from the Canadian federal government to Nunavut began
in May of 2012, and will continue for some time.255
B.

Nunavut's Legal andPolitical Relevance regarding Emerging Arctic
Resources

Most of the valuable mineral wealth in the Canadian Arctic lies
under the land or waters of Nunavut. While there are still substantial
deposits within the Northwest Territories and in the open ocean
beyond the Canadian Archipelago, large quantities of mineral wealth
lie within the Nunavut Settlement Area ("NSA").2 6 Furthermore,
249. Martin Frobisher, PUB.
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FRANK J. TESTER, TAMMARNIIT: INUIT RELOCATION IN THE
ARCTIC 1939-63 102-104 (1994).

251.

EASTERN

See LISA K. RANKIN, AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE THUNE/INUIT
OCCUPATION OF LABRADOR (2009),
available at http://www.mun.ca/

labmetis/pdf/thuleinuit%20final%20report.pdf.
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icor.ottawainuitchildrens.com/node/29 (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
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255. See, e.g., Nunavut to Begin Devolution Talks, supra note 157.
256. Id.

because of logistical considerations, the mineral wealth in Nunavut
itself will likely be of interest sooner than that further offshore." 7 In
the face of this emerging development, Nunavut's planning and
permitting powers allow it to possibly exert significant leverage over
the development of the basic infrastructure needed to carry out largescale extraction of resources in the open ocean. While Nunavut cannot
currently exert first-hand regulatory control over areas outside of the
NSA, it can actively work to deny infrastructure development of
which it does not approve.
VI. Current Conflicts between Nunavut and Canadian
Federal Regulation
A.

Introduction to Federal-TerritorialLegal Conflicts

There is currently tension between territorial oversight granted by
the NLCAA and Canadian federal law regarding mineral rights,
regulation, and permitting.2 8 This includes environmental oversight of
both marine and land-based exploration and extraction of minerals.
According to the NLCAA, the Canadian federal government retains
the power to grant oil exploration and extraction rights, including
general property rights such as possession of title, transfer of title,
rights of entry and passage, and rights to extraction permits and
leases. 259 The federal regulations regarding these rights create several
conflicts with the powers given to the Nunavut territorial government
through the NLCAA's grant of legislative and rule-making powers.
These conflicts are exacerbated because the NLCAA creates no clear
delineation of how Nunavut territorial regulations apply to mineral
rights when Federal regulations also apply. The same is true for
of oversight and compliance
conflicts between the legal structures
260
under both territorial and federal law.
B.

Conflicts Between the NLCAA and Canadian FederalLaw

The conflicts of law and regulation are diverse, and include
aspects of the NLCAA itself. First, the NLCAA limits the ability of
any non-Inuit organization to access Inuit land. Specifically, the
257. Elizabeth Rosenthal, A Melting Greenland Weighs Perils Against
Potential, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2012, at A4.
258. The main oversight and permitting bodies are the Nunavut Planning
Commission ("NPC"), the Nunavut Impact Review Board ("NIRB"),
and the Nunavut Water Board ("NWB").
259. See

NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS AGREEMENT,

supra note 244.

260. Other federal laws that likely apply to Nunavut but do not create
include the Arctic Shipping Pollution
federal-territorial conflicts
Prevention Regulations, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, and
the Ocean Dumping Prevention Act.

agreement strictly forbids access to Inuit Owned Lands by non-Inuit
organization unless they apply for and are granted access permission
local Inuit
and
government
Nunavut territorial
the
by
organizations."' This provision is in direct conflict with the Canadian
federal government's authority to grant rights to mineral claimants
and the accompanying rights of entry and extraction. 62 Second, the
NLCAA grants the Nunavut Planning Commission ("NPC") with
review, and approve or deny all
exclusive power to formulate,
infrastructure and development projects in the NSA, including private
efforts to develop mineral wealth based on federally recognized
mineral rights claims. 63 Because the Nunavut territorial government
is granted this control, the NPC's powers to approve and deny
development plans clashes with the Canadian federal government's
authority to grant rights to mineral claimants and the accompanying
rights to entry, development, and extraction.
Third, the Nunavut Impact Review Board ("NIRB"), created by
the NLCAA as the main body which measures the social, economic,
and ecologic impacts of proposed development projects, has powers
that also potentially conflict with federal powers. The NIRB's
jurisdiction covers all projects in all land and marine areas of the
NSA. 64 Furthermore, there is language in the NLCAA that also
applies the NIRB's review and permitting powers to projects outside
of the NSA that could have a significant impact on NSA waters or
The NLCAA also specifically grants Designated Inuit
land.265
Organizations the unfettered right to challenge any aspect of an NIRB
certification in Canadian federal court.266 Consequently, even if a
project passes the scrutiny of the NPC and NIRB, local Inuit
check
can further
and advocacy organizations
government
relief
or
for
injunctive
development plans via a petition to the courts
267
other order amending a development plan.
Finally, the NLCAA declares that Nunavut's regulatory and
permitting bodies have general advisory powers regarding activities in
261. NUNAVUT LAND CLAIMS
262. See id., §III.B.
263. Id., art. 11.5.4-11.5.13.

AGREEMENT,

supra note 244, art. 21.2.1.

264. Id.art. 12.11-12.12.
265. Id., arts. 10.1 &12.7 (Regarding Monitoring and Enforcement, the NIRB
has the authority to implement a variety of oversight measures and
reserves the final right to permit or withhold certification of a given
project).
266. Id. art.12.10.5.
267. See Qikiqtani Inuit Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Natural Resources),
(2010) 4 C.N.L.R. 190 (Can. Nun. C.J.) (Court imposed injunction on
seismic testing off of Baffin Island over environmental concerns as area
is rich in marine life vital to local Inuit hunting activities.).

marine areas adjacent to the NSA, and can issue recommended
regulatory provisions for such activities. 68 While this power does not
give Nunavut's regulatory and permitting bodies authority to deny
development outside of the NSA, it does give them the opportunity to
not only give advisory opinions, but also to possibly demand that
those opinions be given due deference in any decision making process.
Should
a proposed
project
directly
contravene
Nunavut's
recommended policy or procedure, it could sue for injunctive relief or
other similar remedy in Canadian federal court.269
C.

Conflicts Between the Nunavut Waters and Surface Rights Tribunal
Act ("NWSRTA ") and Canadian FederalLaw

The NWSRTA, which creates the Nunavut Water Board
("NWB") as a separate body from the NPC and NIRB to review and
license water use and refuse dumping in the NSA, also potentially
conflicts with Canada's federal regulations and permitting of mineral
rights. 7 First, the Act gives Inuit individuals and communities water
use priority over any other person's or organization's use, even
regarding mineral rights granted by the federal government. 7 ' This
allows the NWB to forestall any development that will directly or
indirectly impact Inuit water use should it find cause to do so.
Second, the NWB sets all water quality and effluent standards for the
NSA.272 This power can indirectly interfere with mineral exploration
and extraction within and outside of the NSA, and if activities
interfere with water quality or violate applicable effluent standards,
the offending party could be held liable for the offense itself as well as
any damage caused.
D.

Possible Policy Conflicts Involving Indirect Legal Conflicts

Indirectly, Nunavut's authority to permit projects that support
offshore activities that would otherwise be solely in the purview of
Canadian federal regulations
could complicate
infrastructure
development. For example, any offshore development of Canada's
extensive Arctic oil and gas reserves must first be made possible by
significant infrastructure improvements throughout Nunavut. This
development will include the creation of deep-water ports as well as
268. See
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269. Given the deferential approach generally taken by the Canadian courts
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c. 10, arts. 62-64 (Can).
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onshore fuel holding and transfer stations. These projects, as well as
other necessary land-based and near-shore infrastructure, will be
needed to support the initial drilling activities to establish oil rigs and
maintain their day-to-day operations.273 If Nunavut is not particularly
pleased with any part of this development process for whatever policy
reason, be it economic or ecologic, the territorial government has
sufficient power to seriously impact, if not completely stall, the
mentioned development initiatives. Luckily, Canada already has a
viable model to mitigate these conflicts of law and policy, as it has
already dealt with similar issues regarding offshore oil and gas
exploration and extraction on its eastern coast. (See Section V for a
full analysis and recommendation).
VII. Emerging Conflict over Control of Canadian
Ocean Waters
A.

Devolution of Rights and Conflicting Nunavut-Federal Goals

As Nunavut continues to negotiate its devolution agreement with
the Canadian federal authorities, a number of emerging issues are set
to feature prominently in joint discussions. Chief among these issues,
and in reality their genesis, is the question of jurisdiction over the
claimed internal waters of the Canadian Archipelago. Since the
resolution of this issue will largely dictate the outcomes of the other
included conflicts, this discussion will focus on the jurisdictional
question. Nunavut's current territorial grant, while unclear in certain
areas, unequivocally grants Nunavut regulatory jurisdiction over nearshore waters up to a certain distance from shore. Also, Nunavut has
regulatory jurisdiction over most landfast ice attached to the shoreline
within the NSA, regardless of its distance from the coast. This is due
to the Inuit's reliance on wide-ranging hunting grounds that are
oftentimes only accessible by traversing landfast ice for many
hundreds, if not thousands, of miles.
Nunavut's position entering devolution negotiations is that all
waters "internal" to the Archipelago, and therefore within Nunavut's
territorial grant, are under its sole jurisdiction. 74 This would include
areas covered by land-anchored ice pack as within the territorial
grant, as well as makes up an important part of traditional hunting
grounds. If the Canadian federal government were to cede these
waters to Nunavut's control, it would more or less relinquish its
273. See Donald Ljunggren, Arctic Has Great Riches, But Greater
Challenges, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/08/3 1/us-arctic-idUSTRE77U21420110831.
274. See Jim
Bell,
Okalik: Devolution Must Include Internal Waters,
NUNATSIAQ NEWS
(Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/
archives/61222/news/nunavut/61222_05.html.

powers regarding regulation and permitting of mineral exploration as
well. Furthermore, it is likely that Nunavut would demand such a
transfer of rights and powers, and has already declared its intention
to do so.275 Such a transfer would result in increased territorial
oversight under the NLCAA throughout the Arctic marine
environment.
B.

InternationalLaw Constraints on Nunavut Claims

However, under applicable international law, the standard means
of determining territorial waters would not necessarily give Canada,
or by extension Nunavut, the ability to claim sovereignty over much
of the expansive waters contained within the Canadian Archipelago.
Pertinently, UNCLOS Article 234 was enacted specifically to give
weight to Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic for the purpose of
extending Canada's regulatory power over the waters in and around
the Canadian Archipelago. 7 6 This provision provides the international
justification
for several important pieces of Canadian federal
27 7
legislation regarding shipping and pollution control in the Arctic.
However, Canada's position as having full sovereignty over open
ocean areas in the Archipelago is still contested. While it seems likely
that Canada will be recognized as sovereign in the contested areas,
resolution of the conflict still remains to be determined. Until that
time, any claim by Nunavut to its internal waters is in some sense
278
suspect.
275. See id.
276. UNCLOS, supra note 102, art. 234 ("Coastal States have the right to

adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in icecovered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where

particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological
balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on
the best available scientific evidence.").
277. Relevant laws include the Arctic
Shipping Pollution Prevention
Regulations, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, as well as relevant

parts of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act and the Ocean Dumping
Prevention Act; see also R. v. Gulf Canada Corp., (1987) N.W.T.R. 277
(Can. N.W. Terr. T.C.) (Northwest Territory Court instituted fines for
dumping in the Beaufort Sea related to oil extraction).
278. Until Canada's claims to the waters internal to the Canadian
Archipelago, also known as the Northwest Passages, are fully resolved,
there are possible international legal hurdles to Nunavut's desired
jurisdiction over those waters. Also, there is the possibility of royalty
conflicts where oil and gas deposits lay both within Nunavut's territorial
bounds and also extend beyond into the open ocean, as Nunavut could

C.

1.

Possible Solutions

Federal and Aboriginal Jurisdictional Interests in Arctic Mineral
Extraction

It is possible that Nunavut's desire to have complete regulatory
control over its internal waters could be granted by the Canadian
government. However, this is not necessarily an ideal outcome for
several intertwined legal, political, and practical reasons. Generally,
while it is necessary to respect Nunavut's legitimate interest in
regulating potentially devastatingly harmful activities in nearby
waters, it still seems necessary to preserve some regulatory and
development powers and responsibilities for the Canadian federal
government.
There are several reasons for preserving significant federal input
in the Arctic. First, the Canadian federal government has an
important interest in promoting the development, albeit responsibly,
of its vast Arctic natural resources. Without some measure of direct
federal control, Canada as a whole would have little way to ensure
that its national Arctic development agenda gained traction. Second,
the simple scope and scale of Canada's Arctic territory, as well as
that of the resources becoming available for extraction, creates an
immense new administrative and bureaucratic challenge for whatever
body is tasked with overseeing development. While Nunavut's
territorial government will undoubtedly see an increase in revenue
with increased development (and an accompanying ability to increase
capacity for oversight activities), federal resources would make
possible a regulatory effort that would otherwise be outside of
Nunavut's abilities.279 Third, it is important that the Canadian federal
government has a significant hand in its Arctic infrastructure
development, both because it alone has the resources to create the
installations necessary to support growth, and because its involvement
will further cement its claims to the lands and waters of the
Archipelago. It serves both Canada's and Nunavut's political and
economic interests to have the federal government establish the
infrastructure necessary to increase Canada's military, administrative,
280
and economic abilities in the area.

assert a claim to royalties from the proceeds of those "shared" pools of
resources.
279.

See, e.g., Inuit Still Less Than Half Of GN Workforce: 558 Jobs Go
Unfilled, NUNATSIAQ NEWS
(March 10, 2006), http://64.26.166.116/

archives/603 10/news/nunavut/603 10_10.html.
280. See Allan Woods, Canada Looking At Building Military Bases In
Arctic, TORONTO STAR
(Jul. 14, 2011), http://www.thestar.com/
news/canada/article/1024675--star-exclusive-canada-looking-at-buildingmilitary-bases-in-arctic.

2.

A Federal-Territorial Agreement and Joint Petroleum Board

For these reasons, it would be in Canada's best interest from both
a federal and territorial perspective to create a joint governing body
to oversee the development of its Arctic resources. Fortunately,
several functioning models already exist from which the two parties
can work. As indicated, on Canada's east coast, the federal
government has implemented agreements with several of its eastern
provinces regarding the joint oversight of offshore resource
management."'
These agreements create a joint provincial-federal system to
oversee all aspects of offshore gas and oil development, and most
importantly create a balanced, independent oversight and permitting
board evenly represented by the provinces and the federal
government.
Such a board possesses several powers that would make it an
effective tool to oversee resource development in Canada's Arctic
marine environment. First, the board has the power to prohibit any
party that owns an interest in an offshore mineral right from either
commencing development or continuing operations because of
environmental dangers or extreme weather conditions. 2 Second, the
board, pursuant to its powers as a federal regulatory body, has the
authority to issue property interests in offshore mineral deposits.283
Third, the board has complete control over the permitting process for
the entire range of mineral extraction activities, from exploration, 2 4 to
declaring the existence of commercially exploitable discoveries, 285 and
overseeing the extraction
of any resources through the issuance of
2 6
development orders.
In order to better tailor a possible federal-territorial agreement to
fit Nunavut's needs, any offshore resource agreement would likely
need several additional terms or refinements to adequately safeguard
Nunavut's interests. First, Nunavut would likely desire that the board
would have the explicit authority to set environmental safety
standards for drilling materials,
equipment,
and techniques,
287
particularly in the dangerous early phases of exploratory drilling.
281. See supra note 256, § III.B.
282. Id., § 53(1).
283. Id., § 57(1).

284. Id., § 65-67.
285. Id. at § 78.
286. Id. at § 79.
287 . See Nicholas Cunningham, Offshore Oil Drilling In The U.S. Arctic,
Part Three: Concerns And Recommendations, ARCTIC INST. (July 19,
2012),
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/07/offshore-oil-drillingin-us-arctic-part 19.html; see also Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore

Second, Nunavut would likely desire that the agreement lay out
baseline spill prevention and response standards that must be within
a certain response time to any exploration fields, as well as the
funding mechanisms for these programs. Third, Nunavut would likely
desire agreement terms that give the NPC and NIRB at the very least
an advisory role to board decisions and activities. An alternative
solution could actually place the senior members of these bodies as
some of Nunavut's voting representatives on the board.
Politically, one possible difficulty with implementing this program
would be the necessity for Nunavut to share some of its sought-after
power regarding development in its desired internal waters. Currently,
the Canadian federal government has complete control over these
offshore activities. However, as this plan is a viable option for
governing resource development in all waters in and around the NSA,
giving Nunavut shared jurisdiction in sum, and not merely in its
claimed internal waters could be a beneficial way for the Canadian
federal government to negotiate a continued regulatory presence
throughout its Arctic waters.
D.

Assessing Nunavut

Currently, Nunavut remains years away from effectively
implementing workable plans to capitalize on its vast resources. First,
it badly lacks the infrastructure necessary to facilitate effective use of
its vast natural resources. Significantly, there are currently no roads
connecting Nunavut to the rest of continental Canada, and there are
presently no deep water ports anywhere in the Canadian Arctic.
Current ice-ports cannot handle large-scale infrastructure components.
While air-travel is more accessible, there are few services available to
transfer the machinery and cargoes needed for large-scale
development. Second, conditions are still harsh and forbidding, as
even though sea ice is retreating, a short work season and
construction costs are prohibitive. Third, Nunavut, with a total
population of fewer than forty thousand persons and a challenged
education system, likely lacks sufficiently qualified individuals to staff
many of the proposed development projects.288
As these hurdles are overcome, satisfactory resolutions to the
discussed conflicts become ever more important because of what is at
stake in the Canadian Arctic. On the one hand, Canada would be
foolish to allow ineffective and inefficient regulatory paradigms to
hinder its further economic development. On the other hand, the
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28, §
153 (Can.).
288. See Patrick White, The Trials Of Nunavut: Lament For An Arctic
Nation, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/news/national/nunavut/the-trials-of-nunavut-lament-for-an-arcticnation/article 1963420/singlepage/#articlecontent.

unspoiled vastness of Nunavut would likely be severely impacted
ecologically if the worst case scenario of a major spill in the open sea
of the Canadian Arctic were to happen. This outcome would do great
damage to Canada, both culturally and economically. Such a humanmade disaster in the Canadian Arctic would likely result in expensive,
prolonged, and acrimonious litigation in Canadian territorial and
federal courts, as well as massive public disapproval. While the legal
outcomes are hard to predict, given the Canadian courts' deference to
traditional aboriginal culture, such an offense would likely open the
responsible private and public entities to potentially massive liability,
as well as possible legislation imposing moratoriums on resource
extraction. Arctic resource exploration and extraction is quickly
moving from tomorrow's possibility to today's reality. It would
behoove Canada to be prepared with responsible, yet efficient,
regulations and policies.
Conclusion
Technological advances coupled with an unprecedented degree of
ice melt is creating new opportunities for the development of oil and
natural gas in the Arctic region. However, full utilization of these
resources efficiently, economically, and safely, will require cooperation
from all interested parties, including national governments, subnational governments (both provinces and states), independent
regulatory bodies, aboriginal groups, and private industries. Before
effective development can occur, these groups must address a host of
emerging issues regarding ownership and exploration rights, which
may require higher levels of intergovernmental communication, the
use of international dispute resolution bodies, or the development of
new regulatory institutions. However, these groups must also be
mindful to address follow-on issues, such as environmental and safety
regulation. While national governments, vested ethnic groups, and oil
and gas-related industries may have different interests and objectives,
the Arctic provides a unique opportunity for these governments and
organizations to work effectively towards a common goal-the
efficient and safe development of new energy resources.

